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Abstract 
 
Within the current upspring of protectionism, countries are increasingly using different barriers to trade 
in pursuing their political interests. This paper analyses the effects of Russian sanctions on Georgian 
trade flow imposed in 2006 and examines the effect on trade diversion. The paper estimates the effect 
of complete embargo on Georgian agricultural products by applying Synthetic Control Method (SCM) 
and measuring the difference between the food export level of a real and synthetic country. Results 
reveal that difference in exports to Russia between the real and synthetic Georgia is negative after 2006. 
Opposite trend is examined in exports to the European Union, for which the difference between real 
and synthetic Georgia is positive. Paper concludes that trade sanctions had a negative impact on 
Georgian trade flow to Russia, which was increasing in time, however, country managed to divert its 
trade to the European Union countries.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
International economic events or policy interventions gain attention of a number of researchers, 
especially economic events which happen due to drastic changes in political relations of the 
countries. Link between political conflict and trade has been extensively researched by the 
number of papers (Martin et.al (2008), Haidar (2017), Michaels and Zhi (2010)). As a tool of 
diplomatic policy, governments impose trade restrictions in order to increase export losses of 
sender country’s economy (Crozet and Hinz 2016). Political instabilities have a strong effect 
on economies, however, it is difficult to estimate how would countries develop in the absence 
of them (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003).  This paper investigates the impact of Russian trade 
sanctions on Georgian agricultural products imposed in 2006, measures the impact of the event 
and analyses further whether these barriers resulted into trade diversion for Georgia from old 
partner to new partner countries.  
Referring to the recent diplomatic policy of the countries, paper examines whether political 
events could be named as the main reason behind imposing trade sanctions on Georgian 
exports.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991 Georgia restored its independence. However, 
since then country’s main exporting market was Russia.1 This was supported by political 
relations of two countries, until Revolution of Roses in 2003, which lead to shifting the political 
and economic centre towards west. As a result, political relations with Russia have been 
worsened. In 2005, the Russian government imposed a ban on Georgian plant origin products, 
blaming Georgia for violating the phytosanitary norms. This was followed by imposing trade 
sanctions on the main exporting goods (wine and mineral water) in April 2006, thus complete 
                                                 
1 National statistics office of Georgia www.geostat.ge 
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embargo on agricultural products was imposed by Russian federation. 2 These products always 
had the highest share in exports to Russia compared to other product categories. Before the 
sanctions share of food exports was on average 65% percent of total exports, while after 2006 
it decreased to 1%. 3 
Number of researchers have analysed effects of trade barriers on trade flows of the countries, 
((Madsen (2001), Maskus and Wilson (2000), Haveman et al. (2003)). This study differs from 
the previous studies as it examines the effect of the event which happened ‘’overnight’’ and 
was unexpected for Georgian producers. Paper applies synthetic control method, which is a 
developed approach for comparative case studies by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) who 
studied economic effect of conflict in the Basque country. It has been challenging for 
researchers to conduct an empirical analysis of non-tariff barriers, especially for transition 
economies, where the data may not be available or not accurate. For the case study of Russia-
Georgia trade relations, analyses on the severity of this sanctions are poor. A comparison of 
the dynamics of Georgian exports and the export from the rest of the post-Soviet States will 
reflect the effect of sanctions. Furthermore, this study widens the scope of the method, 
contributes to the empirical analysis of trade sanctions effecting country-pair and estimates 
quantitative impact of Russian embargo on exports of agricultural products of Georgia.  
To assess the consequences of Russian barriers on Georgian trade, this paper obtains data from 
World Bank, World integrated Trade Solution (WITS), National Statistics office of Georgia 
databases and UN Comtrade Database. Data represents annual country-level panel of 19 
countries from Central and East Europe and Central Asia over the period of 1996-2012.  
The case of Georgian-Russian trade relations has been discussed widely, however, there is lack 
of empirical analysis on the topic and to my best knowledge, none of the researchers have 
applied synthetic control approach for measuring the effect of Russian complete embargo on 
Georgian trade flows.  
Analyses present two different effects on Georgian trade. First, the results depict that Russian 
barriers decreased export of Georgian food products significantly, which is proved as a 
difference of the trade flows of real and synthetic country. In the second part of the study 
empirical findings  show that trade from the main trading partner was diverted to the European 
Union countries because the share of export to the Western world has been increased compared 
                                                 
2Georgian parliamentary cooperation committee (2006)  http://www.parliament.ge/files/491_6282_639100_8th-meeti-
12-september-2006.pdf 
3 World integrated trade solution database www.wits.worldbank.org  
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to the case of absence of Russian sanctions and as estimated by SCM, difference between trade 
of real vs synthetic country is positive .  
The thesis is organized as following: Section 2 presents literature review, section 3 shares 
background of Georgian-Russian relations, Section 4 discusses Synthetic Control Approach 
for comparative case studies and describes data, section 5 depicts empirical results, section 6 
discusses effect on trade diversion and section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Related literature 
 
In this section, I will present related literature to trade barriers and their consequences. First 
part of the section provides a generic overview of trade barriers, along with possible socio-
political motives behind their imposition. One of the aims of the chapter is to give an overview 
of the specific forms of barriers such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, sanctions including the 
trade embargoes. The literature review will refer to the studies analysing the effect of these 
restrictions on trade flows of the countries and underline possible consequences of them in the 
form of trade diversion or reduction.  
Trade restrictions can be imposed due to various reasons. The most widely used economic 
arguments are protection of domestic production, stabilize currency, fight against dumping and 
technological development. Non-economic arguments could be national security or 
reallocation of consumption of socially nonrecommendable products, Bhagwati (1998). 
Furthermore, it could be used as a weapon against smaller developing countries which have 
few trading partners (Hawkes and Murphy 2010). The motive behind imposing sanctions in 
most cases is instability of political relations, meaning not only conflict between two countries 
but also its relations to the rest of the world. An example of an interesting impact of diplomatic 
relations on trade is presented by Fuchs and Klann (2013), who state that meetings with Dalai 
Lama have a negative effect on the host country. Authors apply gravity model of exports from 
159 countries to China during 1991-2008 and measure whether countries which host Dalai 
Lama do experience decline in exports. Interestingly, findings show that as a punishment, 
exports to China experience significant reduction after the meeting with a spiritual leader.  
In general, trade barriers can be divided into tariff and non-tariff barriers (Ray 1987).  Fugazza 
and Maur (2008) state that it is hard to analyse non-tariff barriers and provide quantitative 
impact since their nature varies from technical barriers to sanitary or phytosanitary measures. 
However, with decreasing number of tariff barriers, the importance of analysis of NTBs has 
been raised, which stands as one of the motivations of this paper.  
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Some economists have a sceptical attitude towards sanctions, for example Milton Friedman 
once said ‘’All in all, economic sanctions are not effective weapon of political welfare.’’ 
Followed by saying of George Schulz: ‘’As a general proposition, I think the use of trade 
sanctions as an instrument of diplomacy is a bad idea… Our using it here, there and elsewhere 
to try to affect some other country’s behaviour… basically has not worked. ‘’ 
Haveman et al. (2003) analyse the effects of trade barriers based on disaggregated data, which 
allows classifying effects of tariff and non-tariff barriers into reduction, diversion and 
compression. Analysis shows that besides reduction of trade, which is caused by trade barriers, 
diversion of trade flows is the main feature of them, as tariffs from one partner might convince 
a country to switch trade towards new exporters.  
Madsen (2001) studies the impact of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers on worldwide trade 
during the period 1929-1932.  Paper analyses different factors which contributed to the 
decrease of world trade, mainly income, tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. Based on the 
analyses of panel data author studies the effects of the restrictions from the estimates of import 
and export function, followed by the decomposition of trade contraction into the effects of 
income and trade barriers. As a result, concluding that 41% of contraction in world trade over 
the years 1929-1932 was due to trade barriers. Maskus and Wilson (2000) refer to the analysis 
of non-tariff trade barriers, raising due to product regulations and standards in developing 
world. They state that regulations imposed by governments lead to distortions of the markets, 
especially when developing countries need to invest higher resources to meet export standard.  
Lee and Swagel (1997) study political and economic determinants of non-tariff barriers based 
on the data of both developed and developing 41 countries in 1988, along with the effect of 
protection on trade flows. Authors find that countries more often protect weaker industries, 
however, large industries receive protection by the imposition of non-tariff barriers.  
Additionally, an interesting finding of the paper is that non-tariff barriers and exchange rate 
controls were more significant barriers for trade compared to tariffs.  
One of the key aims of trade barriers is usually protectionism in order to protect domestic 
producers from import competition (Scheve and Slaughter 2007), number of papers have 
examined it from this perspective (Hillman 1982, Bohara and Kaempfer 1991, Trefler 1993). 
In his analysis Trefler (1993) found out that in 1983 US non-tariff barriers (NTBs) reduced US 
imports by 49.5$ million. Harrigan (1993) also analysed the link between trade barriers and 
import reduction and concluded that tariffs have a higher effect on the level of imports, 
compared to non-tariff barriers.  
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Nowadays, the effect of trade barriers remains an active issue for researchers. As presented 
above, the topic can be investigated from different perspectives by various methods. However, 
as mentioned by Fugazza and Maur (2008) empirical analysis of non-tariff barriers are 
infrequent. Having stated this, paper will make its contribution towards expansion of these 
analyses of trade barriers.  
Trade sanctions, which by its aim restrict the trade, contradict to one of the main objectives of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) - to help its members gain from trade and support trade 
liberalisation events. The scope of sanctions can be quite broad, starting from trade reduction 
on specific goods and products to full embargo, when all types of trade relations with the 
country are blocked (Smeets 2018). 
Many researchers try to quantify the costs of sanctions, which has been extensively researched 
during the last decades ((Baldwin (1990), Anderson and Wincoop (2004), Yue et.al (2006), 
Hummels (1999), Dee et.al (2003)). Crozet and Hinz (2016) evaluate export losses from the 
sanctions as a tool of foreign diplomatic strategy to influence sender country’s economy. 
Authors analyse the case of diplomatic conflict beginning in 2014 between Western countries 
and Russia along with Ukraine’s political crisis. Based on the monthly data from 78 countries 
and by conducting general equilibrium counterfactual analysis, findings provide an estimation 
of overall loss of exports due to sanctions, which were imposed during political instability. 
Going deep into analysis authors took an example of French firms and found effect of trade 
diversion.  
Caruso (2003), Hufbauer (1990) and Drezner (1999) provide a broad overview of sanctions, 
analyse the reasons behind their initiation and the determinants of success. Similarly, Hufbauer 
(1990) looks at economic sanctions since World War 1 and provides deep analysis of their 
success and failure. Furthermore, Drezner (1999) argues that while imposing trade barriers 
both parties raise their expectations towards conflict. Allen (2008) extends analyses by 
studying political costs of sanctions.    
Referring to country-specific example, one could draw parallels to US sanctions on Iran, as 
until 1979 US was Iran’s main trade pattern, similar situation as Georgia had with Russia. 
Clawson (1998) stated that trade barriers have not pushed Iran to change its behaviour while 
on the contrary, Preeg (1999) evaluates US sanctions as a negative impact on Iran’s trade 
pattern. Similar issue has been researched by Haidar (2017), who analysed the effect of 
sanctions imposed in 2008 on Iranian export by US, EU, Canada and Australia. Understanding 
how these sanctions have affected the behaviour of Iranian exporters helps to draw parallels 
towards the potential behaviour of other exporter countries. To examine this, author analysed 
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firm-level data and found that sanctions had higher impact on average Iranian exporter leading 
to significant welfare loss and export deflection to other markets.  
Cenusa et.al (2014) analyse the effect and implication of Russian sanctions towards three 
Eastern European States: Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Obviously, for all of these 3 states, 
sanctions pushed them to diversify their export market and move towards EU. In the case of 
Moldova, after imposing trade barriers, country’s export towards EU grew by 22.5% in 2014, 
compared to 2013, while exports to CIS countries decreased by 18.8%. Various scenarios have 
been noticed in Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia because for Ukraine and Georgia, market 
openness or proximity is strongly defined by the political leadership of the countries. However, 
since the introduction of Russian ‘’punishment measures’’ significant increase in export level 
from these countries to the EU has been noticed.  
Specific form of trade sanction is embargo, meaning that import is banned completely, which 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1976) name as ‘’market disruption phenomena’’ and analyse optimal 
response policy intervention. Similarly, Lundborg (2017) examines the link between export 
embargoes and political factors, by application of world trade general equilibrium model, 
mainly relying on the analysis of US grain embargo on the Soviet Union. Embargoes might 
have an effect on other dimensions of the economy. Referring to the recent example of the 
longest embargo in history-US embargo on Cuba (Garfield and Santana 1997), which besides 
the direct effect on trade had also an indirect impact on health. More precisely, nutrition rich 
food was affected, since it was imported to Cuba, which eventually resulted into the decrease 
of sufficient protein amount per capita by 25% and overall sufficient decrease of calories by 
18%.  
 
Number of papers have been dedicated to the effects of trade on political relations between 
countries ((Maoz (2009), Dorussen (2006), Li and Reuveny (2011)). Martin et.al (2008) studied 
the relation between political conflict and trade. By defining multilateral or bilateral trade 
openness of the countries and applying instrumental variable method, authors concluded that 
trade increases the chance for military conflicts. Similarly, Borrus and Zysman (1990) state 
that dependence on trade causes insecurities which later might provoke conflict between 
trading partners. 
An opposite view is shared by Buzan (1984), stating that conflict arises by political and military 
factors and not from trade. Case study of Russia-Georgia would confirm the analysis of latter, 
since despite the fact that Russia was Georgian main exporter market, due to the size of the 
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country this relation is less likely to cause insecurities for the receiver economy. However, 
overall loss from trade might be identical to the cost of the war itself (Glick and Taylor 2010). 
 
2.1 Trade diversion  
 
Trade barriers lower trade on a country pair which is opposite to the case when country joins 
custom unions or signs Free Trade Agreements.  In the long run, trade restrictions could result 
into trade diversion for the countries. Viner (1950) coined the term “trade diversion”. 
According to him, “trade diversion” occurs when the low-cost rest of the world partner is 
replaced by a high cost partner country and there is a welfare loss for the home country.” This 
paper will measure the trade diversion as a result of Russian sanctions on Georgian exports and 
contribute to the measurement methods of such trade diversion by application of synthetic 
control approach.  
During the last two decades, economic regionalism lead to the spread of Free Trade 
Agreements (Sun and Reed 2010). Number of papers refer to the analysis of trade diversion, 
supported by regional trade agreements ((Freund (2005), Ornelas (2005), Sun and Reed 
(2010)). For the case study of Georgian trade flow after the ‘’shock’’ of 2006, number of free 
trade agreements provide solid ground for the opportunity of trade diversion from Russia to 
new partner countries. Georgia signed a free trade agreement with Turkey in 2007 on 27th of 
June, in 2014 EU and Georgia signed an Association Agreement which has entered into force 
since 1 July 2016,4  in 2017 free trade agreement was signed with the Republic of China. 
Currently, Georgia has free trade regime with all CIS countries, Turkey, European Union, 
Peoples Republic of China and European Free Trade Association (EFTA).5 FTAs have created 
a significant possibility to adjust trade embargo of Russia-oriented trade to other partners. 
As has been concluded by several papers ((Kohl (2014), Frankel (1997), Carrere (2006), 
Jayasinghe and Sarker (2008)) the statement that free trade agreements have driven to the 
increase of trade flows among countries is inevitable. Relating these studies to Georgia, 
increased number of free trade agreements of the country after 2006, stands as an argument for 
switching trade from Russia to new partner countries.  
To my best knowledge, there is a lack of research based on the case study of Georgia-Russia 
trade relations, which will be investigated in my thesis. Paper focuses on the analysis of trade  
 
                                                 
4 European commission www.ec.europa.eu 
5 Ministry of Economy and Sustainable development of Georgia www.econoomy.ge 
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patterns after 2006 from Georgia to new trading partners and analyses, whether Russian 
embargo, lead to the changes in trading partners of Georgia. 
 
3. Background of Georgian-Russian relations.  
 
I will refer to the history, both political and economic, of Georgian-Russian relations since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, which meant also collapse of the command economy.  In 1991 
Georgia gained independence and took the path towards improving diplomatic relations with 
the European Union and NATO. After this, relations with Russia worsened.  
Papava (2008) outlines Russian-Georgian diplomatic crisis of 1990 but nevertheless mentions 
that Russia was still the main trading partner of the country. Straight after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formulated, which Georgia 
joined slightly later, in 1993, compared to the other former Soviet countries.  The motive of 
joining the union was the hope of territorial integrity of the country. Author emphasizes on the 
fact that CIS was struggling to achieve one of its aims, which was considered to be 
establishment or improvement of economic contacts between member states. As for Georgia 
and Russia, Papava (2008) states that in the mid of 1990s both countries were undergoing the 
process of developing market economy and the strategies applied during the economic system 
of the Soviet Union would not work for the independent states. In 2004 new president of 
Georgia was elected, whose main motivation was to restore territorial integrity of the country 
and as the core strategy claimed country’s aim to join the EU and become both economically 
and politically closer to the Western World.  
Newnham (2015) shares a historical overview of the harsh bilateral actions taken by both 
parties.  In 2006 Russia expelled 2300 Georgians within 4600 deportation notices. Meanwhile, 
Tbilisi arrested four Russian spies and government was refusing to release them. Additionally, 
despite the fact that trade relations between countries generated huge volumes and Georgian 
wine and mineral water were quite popular on Russian market since the times of Soviet Union, 
political instability between neighbouring countries had a strong impact on both economies. 
Russia started an introduction of sanctions on Georgian export in December 2005 and by the 
end of April 2006 complete embargo was imposed on Georgian wine and mineral waters. 
Russian Chief Sanitary Inspector Gennady Onishchenko named Georgian wine as “poison”. 
Number of economists state that after this event, natural diversification of Georgian exports 
took place. Cenusa et.al (2014) examined the impact of Russian sanctions on Georgian trade 
and states that before the embargo Georgian wine was exported to 36 countries, while after 
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Russian embargo this number increased by 15 new markets, among which are China, Poland, 
Germany and Singapore. 
Kelkitli (2008) outlines the main events between Georgian-Russian relations, which had a 
significantly negative impact on diplomatic as well as economic relations of the countries. 
Author analysis relations of two countries until the 5 days war in August 2008 and provides 
historical overview of the mid-1990s crisis. Georgian Russian relations reached its peak in 
August 2008 when Russian forces invaded Georgia. Georgians expected support from the West 
and when Russian troops crossed Georgia and military airforce started to bomb cities, French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy negotiated with Moscow to stop ceasefire, however it was inevitable 
that Georgia has lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia and no one could help the country restore 
territorial integrity (Antonenko 2008).  
As for comparison, Muiznieks (2008) shares Latvian perspective on Georgian security which 
has been a complex issue in terms of domestic and foreign policies of the country. Author 
draws parallels between Georgian-Russian and Latvian-Russian relations, by pointing out that 
Russian politics towards Georgia may be copied to Latvia as well, further stating that Georgia 
is one of the main countries in need of development assistance.  
Thus, during the governing period of M.Saakashvili Georgian-Russian relations were at the 
peak of the crisis, which had a huge impact in terms of socio-economic situation of the country. 
Especially after the war, an attitude of Georgians towards Russian changed completely. 
Russian schools were merged with Georgian ones and education in Russian was barely 
available for ethnic groups living in Georgia.  
The situation changed drastically in 2012, when newly created coalition, Georgian Dream took 
over Saakashvili’s regime. Georgian-Russian relations where reconsidered and the new 
government claimed that they should fix historical mistakes and improve relations with the 
neighbour.   
After 7 years of ban, on 15th of June 2013 export of 36 Georgian wine producers and 4 types 
of mineral waters was restored to Russia.6 Based on this, export to Russia increased, which is 
depicted in the graph 1.  
Despite the increase of exports in 2013, there was a considerable decrease in 2015, which 
proves the claim that Russian economic sanctions are strongly related to the political 
orientation of the partner countries. In 2015 Russia took measures towards the countries joining 
EU sanctions imposed against Crimea. 
                                                 
6 “Georgia Doubles Wine Exports as Russian Market Reopens” Sputnik international. (www.sputniknews.com). 
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    Graph1. Total export to Russia from Georgia  
 
     Data source: National statistics office of Georgia: www.geostat.ge 
 
Based this, the Federal Service for the Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human 
Welfare - Rospotrebnadzor statement7 made in 2015 states that in 2015, 45 producers have 
exported wine to Russia the volume of which was estimated to be around 6,720,310.95 litters. 
10 alcoholic beverages didn’t meet the safety standards of Russian federation, over which 
Russian party takes serious control. During that period Russia’s main argument towards the 
ban of Georgian exports were safety standards which Georgia couldn’t meet. However, the 
quality of Georgian wine is controlled by national wine agency of Georgia. 8 
 
4. Methodology: The Synthetic Control Approach  
Case studies for regional economic events are estimated through detailed analyses by 
comparing economic conditions before and after the intervention. Synthetic control approach 
is one of the methods for evaluating the quantitative impact of a policy intervention or 
economic event at an aggregate level (McClelland and Gault 2017). Synthetic control method 
is developed for comparative case studies by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) who studied the 
economic effect of conflict in the Basque country and found that per capita GDP declined by 
10 percentage points compared to synthetic control region. As an advantage of the synthetic 
                                                 
7 “On alcohol control from Georgia” Rospotrebnadzor 
https://rospotrebnadzor.ru/about/info/news/news_details.php?ELEMENT_ID=3983 
8 National wine agency of Georgia www.georgianwine.gov.ge 
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control method, authors state the possibility to systematically select comparison groups. This 
approach was later developed by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), who presented 
advantages and limitations of the method and analysed the effects of the proposition 99, a 
tobacco control program which was implemented in California in 1988. Under this method, 
researchers construct a weighted combination of control countries- i.e., a synthetic control, 
which approximates the treatment group or unit as closely as possible in the counterfactual case 
of no treatment. As defined in Abadie et al. (2010) terms “treatment unit”, “treatment group” 
“region” and “intervention” or “treatment” can be later used as “country” and “shock” or 
“event”. Detailed technical outline of the equations of synthetic control method is presented in 
Appendix 1.  
Weights of the synthetic control unit are chosen in a way that pre-intervention outcome and 
predictors of the synthetic control are on average very similar to the ones of the treated country. 
Sum of the weights is restricted and equal to 1, which enables the model to avoid extrapolation 
(Abadie et. al 2010). Therefore, this approach is characterized with the ‘’transparency’’ and 
‘’flexibility’’ meaning that weights identify countries which are used to estimate the dependent 
variable for the treated region and potential controls can be chosen to be relevant for the studies. 
(Billmeier and Nannicini 2011). One of the difficulties of the approach is to choose the list of 
the potential control countries which will have similar characteristics as the unit exposed to the 
intervention and at the same time, none of them would have had any similar event for the 
pretreatment period.  
In this study, the treated unit is Georgia. Intervention or treatment is Russian sanctions on 
Georgian agricultural products imposed in 2006. Synthetic version of the treatment unit is 
created by the control pool of 18 countries from Central and East Europe and Central Asia. 
Georgia – an 8th country from the list of all 19 countries ordered alphabetically and is an only 
region affected by the intervention because none of the countries examined trade barriers by 
Russia on agricultural products over the period 1996-2012. One of the reasons behind choosing 
time period of analysis were trade relations of the countries with Russia, which started to 
worsen after 2012, for example, Ukraine and Albania, towards which sanctions were imposed 
later and extending the time frame of the analysis would make method invalid and lead to 
biased results. Preintervention period is 1996-2006, intervention period is 2006, the 
postintervention period is 2006-2012. Treatment had no effect on the outcome before the event, 
meaning that real vs synthetic Georgia match perfectly before the intervention in 2006.  
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One of the shortcomings of the method is that standard ways of inferential techniques cannot 
be applied, usually due to a small number of observations (Abadie and Hainmueller 2010). To 
check the robustness of the results placebo test is commonly used (Billmeier and Nannicini 
2011). For reference, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), applied the same technique to the similar 
region to Basque country - to Catalonia for comparing it to the actual unit which was exposed 
to the intervention. This approach was extended by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) 
who applied synthetic control algorithm to every US state (other than the treatment state 
California), in other words to every control group member and compared the estimated placebo 
gaps with the effect of the actual treatment unit California. This paper follows the approach 
and applies placebo in space and in-time placebo for checking the robustness of the results, 
which are presented in section 5. 
4.1 Data  
Data used in this thesis is the yearly panel of 19 countries from Central and East Europe and 
Central Asia9 during the years of 1996-2012. Data includes 3894 observations for 19 countries 
and their trading partners: Russia and the European Union over the period 2006-2012. While 
measuring the impact of Russian sanctions, the dependent variable is food export level to 
Russia, taken from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database10, independent variables 
are obtained directly from World Bank Database11.   
Independent variables also known as predictors are measured before the sanctions and are 
following: Foreign direct investment, GDP, GDP growth, Unemployment rate, population size 
and food export to the EU. Analysis also consist of measuring effects in terms of trade 
diversion. In this analysis, dependent variable is food export to the EU and food export level 
to Russia is switched to predictors and measured before the sanctions, therefore the list of 
predictors is following: Foreign direct investment, GDP, GDP growth, Unemployment rate, 
population size and food export to Russia.  
As one of the advantages of the method, synthetic control approach gives flexibility to 
researchers for choosing predictors and comparison countries (Billmeier and Nannicini 2011). 
Reasoning behind choosing each independent variable for this study is shared below:  
                                                 
9 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Serbia. FR(Serbia/Montenegro), Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine 
10 https://wits.worldbank.org/  
11 World Bank Database https://data.worldbank.org/ 
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• Food export to Russia- Represents aggregate food export level to Russia, measured 
in thousands of US dollars based on deflated variables and stands as a dependent 
variable while measuring the effect on real trade after imposition of Russian embargo 
on Georgian agricultural products. Largest proportion of overall export to Russia has 
been accounted for food products, on average ~65% and remaining stable over the 
years, the level of which dropped drastically to 1% after imposing trade restrictions. 
For constructing synthetic Georgia information for food export from all countries 
included in the controls is obtained from WITs database. In the second part of the paper, 
while measuring the effect of trade diversion, food export to Russia is applied as a 
predictor and the dependent variable is export to the EU.  
This variable had highest influence on choosing list of countries which could be 
included into the control pool, since Synthetic Control Method doesn’t allow to have a 
missing observation for any dependent variable, so countries for which data was 
missing weren’t included into the list of potential controls. 
• Food export to the EU-represents aggregate food export level to the EU, is measured 
in thousands of US dollars and presented for all countries of the control group. Since 
most of the countries in the control pool are post-Soviet states who started to develop 
market economy at the end of the 20th century, during Soviet times none of the countries 
would report export to any single EU countries, thus for creating synthetic and real 
treated unit food export to the EU stands as a significant measurement.  
• GDP-real GDP measured in US dollars source of which is World Bank national 
accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. GDP as one of the main 
indicators of economic performance and wealth of the countries (Summers and Heston 
1991). Number of papers have used GDP variable as a control in order to analyze export 
growth or diversification. (Henriques and Sadorsky (1996), Marhubi (2000)) 
• Foreign direct investments (FDI)– Data are in current U.S. dollars. Obtained from 
"International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments database, supplemented by data 
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and official national 
sources." 12 
Based on one of the motivations of paper, defined as studying the effect of trade 
diversion, FDI stands as an important measurement. Similar to the Unemployment rate, 
this variable is a common indicator for most post-Soviet states. Furthermore, 
                                                 
12 World Bank Database https://data.worldbank.org/ 
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highlighting the importance of export diversification, Iwamoto and Nabeshima (2012) 
have found that FDI inflow strongly correlates with export diversification of the 
country. Additionally, number of studies have examined effect of FDI on the export 
level of the countries ((Sharma (2000), Zheng et. al (2004), Harding and Javorcik 
(2011)). Paper includes FDI into the predictors to construct synthetic Georgia since its 
trend for potential controls is similar and the variable matching between real and 
synthetic Georgia is significant.  
• GDP growth rate- an annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency obtained from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD 
National Accounts data files. Similar to FDI and unemployment rate GDP growth rate 
is a common indicator for the countries included in the control pool, since most of them 
started developing the market economy at the beginning of 90’s after the collapse of 
Soviet Union. Therefore, this variable should be considered as an important 
determinant of export growth of the countries. Number of papers have studied the link 
between GDP and export growth of the countries ((Xu (1996), Shafaeddin (1995), 
Feder (1983)) 
• Population size – is based on the facto definition of the population, counting all 
residents of the country. Values are midyear estimates. This variable is another 
measurement for the size of the economy which has the potential to affect pattern of 
international trade relations of the country, (Alesina et. al 2005) Population size has 
potential in determining specialization of the country, for instance, assuming that larger 
population would mean higher ‘’equipped labour’’ depicting the difference between 
total factor productivity (TFP) and capital endowments of the countries. Furthermore, 
Delacroix (1977) studies the relation between export and economic growth and states 
that population size effects specialization of the country and its level of exports. In this 
paper, as shown in predictor balancing table, population size of real vs synthetic 
Georgia match well, thus presenting the validity of this variable to be included to the 
analyses as a predictor.  
 
• Unemployment rate-Unemployment, total (% of the total labour force, modelled ILO 
estimate). Unemployment rate is the common indicator for post-Soviet states and 
transition economies, since in Soviet Union almost all citizens were employed without 
any salary differentiation. However, after the collapse of the system, these states started 
to experience financial deficit, increased unemployment rate and foreign debt 
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(Silagadze 2017). Since most of the countries included in the control pool represent 
post-Soviet economies, this variable has been included into the predictors, in order to 
create a synthetic unit which would resemble its real version in case of absence of the 
event. Furthermore, unemployment rate has a direct impact on the trade relations of the 
countries, namely Batra and Naqvi (1987) analysed the relation between unemployment 
rate and trade openness of the country, concluding that even in the presence of 
unemployment, free trade dominates over no trade. Dutt et al. (2009) analyse link 
between trade liberalisation and unemployment and find a significant difference 
between short and long-run effects of them. Unemployment rate has been extensively 
applied in the field of international trade ((Davidson et al. (1999), Helpman et al. 
(2010), Epifani et al. (2005)), thus presenting its relevance for including it to the list of 
independent variables for estimating the impact of Russian trade sanctions on Georgian 
trade flow.  
Countries which are included in the pool for constructing synthetic Georgia, are chosen in 
terms of similarities in macroeconomic indicators and history. Most of them represent post-
Soviet states, sharing the same ‘’ground’’ for economic development after restoring 
independence. These countries are following:  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, 
Ukraine. Georgia represents the treated unit, however for robustness check of the results 
(section 5) the country is switched to the pool of controls.  
5. Empirical results 
Using the SCM paper investigated the effect of Russian sanctions on Georgian trade. Synthetic 
Georgia is constructed with the control units (countries) from Central and East Europe and 
Central Asia. Study eliminated countries which had barriers from Russia on agricultural 
products, eventually, 18 countries were chosen to be included into the control.  Outcome 
variable is the level of food exports to Russia. Treatment year is 2006 when complete embargo 
on agricultural products was imposed by Russia. Predictors are averaged over the pre-treatment 
year range. Pre-treatment year range is 1996-2005.  
First of all, referring to the sample statistics I compare the trends of food export to Russia from 
the rest of the controls against the trend from Georgia. This is the first step of identifying 
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whether countries from control pool will create a suitable comparison group for Georgia to 
estimate the effects of Russian sanctions on Georgian trade flow.  
Comparing figure 1 and 2 trends are similar until 2005, however after the treatment period 
trends start to diverge, exports from Georgia began to decrease, while for the rest of the controls 
it was still increasing until 2008, after which drastic drop is noticed.   
                  Figure 1. Food export to Russia from the rest of the controls  
 
Data source: World integrated trade solution database www.wits.worldbank.org 
 
                  Figure 2. Food export to Russia from Georgia 
 
 
                    Data source: World integrated trade solution database www.wits.worldbank.org 
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The reason behind the decreased trend in 2008 might be Russian crisis, during which overall 
Trade Restrictiveness Indices (OTRI) have been increased from 0.9 to 1.2 percentage points. 
(Kee et al. 2013). Comparing the decrease for Georgia against the rest of the controls, the 
drastic drop has been examined for the treated unit, while for the rest of the controls food export 
to Russia started to increase after 2006.  
The central question is what would be the export level to Russia from Georgia in the absence 
of sanctions. Synthetic control method provides us the way to estimate this effect. As it is 
described above, based on the methods outlined in Abadie and Hainmueller (2010) synthetic 
Georgia is constructed by the combination of the countries included in the control pool.  
Potential control units include 18 countries from Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
As shown in Table1, these are countries which resemble Georgia in terms of relations with 
Russia as well as macroeconomic indicators which are later chosen as explanatory variables.  
Synthetic control approach assigns weights to each country, based on the estimated results the 
largest weight is assigned to Armenia equal to 0.842. This result seems logical since both 
countries belong to Caucasus region, meaning they share common values, culture and at some 
extent history as well. Additionally, as it can be seen from the Figure3 until 2006 food exports 
from Armenia to Russia resemble the trend of Georgia until the intervention.  
 
      Figure3. Food exports to Russia from Armenia 
 
 
 
     Data source: World integrated trade solution database www.wits.worldbank.org 
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Other participants in the weighted average are following: Belarus (0.057) Kazakhstan (0.001) 
and Serbia (0.1) all the rest of the countries have been assigned 0 weight.  
 
                                        Table 1. Weights assigned to the pool of controls 
 
Country Weight 
Armenia 0.842 
Azerbaijan 0 
Belarus 0.057 
Bulgaria 0 
Croatia 0 
Cyprus 0 
Estonia 0 
Kazakhstan 0.001 
Kyrgyz Republic 0 
Latvia 0 
Lithuania 0 
Moldova 0 
Romania 0 
FR(Serbia/Montenegro) 0.1 
Slovak republic 0 
Slovenia 0 
Turkey 0 
Ukraine 0 
                                                   Source: author 
 
In order to demonstrate similarity between real and synthetic treated unit, table 2 presents 
predictor balancing table for Georgia, which is the outcome of a comparison between 
explanatory variables for the treated unit over the pre-treatment period.  As it can be seen from 
the table, independent variables, FDI, unemployment rate, population size and food export to 
the EU are well balanced for synthetic vs treated unit, slightly higher gap is noticed within 
independent variables - GDP and GDP growth rate, which is not well balanced for treated and 
synthetic country. All variables are averaged for the pre-treatment period (1996-2005). FDI, 
GDP, food export to EU and food export to Russia are measured in thousands of dollars, 
unemployment rate and GDP growth is measured in percentages and population in thousands. 
As presented in table2 comparing the numbers with the average of 19 control states, it can be 
seen that average level of FDI, GDP growth and Unemployment rate was lower in control pool 
compared to real Georgia before the preintervention period.  An average number of populations 
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is bigger in the rest of the controls, which is logical, since the population of Georgia is 3.27 
million13, while for some countries (for example, Ukraine, Kyrgyz Republic) number is bigger. 
Mean Square Prediction Error (MSPE) is minimized before the pretreatment period 1996-2005. 
Goodness of fit can be evaluated by calculating the root mean squared prediction error 
(RMSPE) between the actual and synthetic unit (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015). 
RMSPE is the average of the squared discrepancies between food export to Russia from real 
Georgia and its synthetic counterpart for the pretreatment period and equal to 10135.28 and as 
presented in figure 4 after the treatment, real and synthetic Georgia start to diverge, presenting 
the significant negative effect of the treatment.  
 
Table 2. Predictor balancing real and synthetic Georgia along with average values of 19 control   
countries 
  Georgia     
Variables       Treated Synthetic 
Average of 19 
controls 
GDP 3.82 4.95 5.66 
FDI 2.53 1.86 2.35 
Export to the EU 5429.7 6322.94 206825 
GDP growth 6.62 8.09 4.55 
Unemployment rate 13.00 12.07 10.5865 
Population 4398520 3914480 8267081 
Export to Russia (2005) 108028.4 87293.06 108360 
Export to Russia (2001) 37467.52 38358.35  56494.35  
Export to Russia (1997) 35127.66 31470.58 107975.6  
          Source: author Note: ‘’Export’’ refers to food exports.  
 
Figure 4 depicts the trend over the period 1996-2012, which shows that before the event, actual 
and synthetic data fit well, meaning that the level of exports of Georgia versus its synthetic 
counterpart is very close to each other for the entire pre-treatment period.  This proves that 
synthetic Georgia is able to provide precise projections of the export level in case the event 
would not occur. After the intervention in 2006, the lines start to divert in a way that synthetic 
Georgia has higher values compared to real Georgia, meaning that the gap is significantly 
negative. The effect of the intervention will be measured by the difference between the real 
and synthetic data.  
Additionally, figure 4 shows that while synthetic Georgia followed the trend of the rest of the 
controls (shown in figure 1) real Georgia experiences a sharp decrease right after the treatment.  
                                                 
13National Statistics office of Georgia www.geostat.ge 
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                 Figure 4. Food export to Russia from Georgia vs Synthetic Georgia 
 
 
                   Source: author 
                     Note: measured in thousands of US dollars  
 
Results reveal that export in 2007, right after the event was lowered by 132904.9 thousands of 
US$ compared to the case of absence of sanctions, this decrease was increasing in time (figure 
5) which proves that sanctions had a large negative effect on the food export level to Russia.  
 
                  Figure5. Gap of food exports to Russia between Georgia and synthetic Georgia.   
 
 
                    Source: author   
                    Note: measured in thousands of US dollars 
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Gap for the countries which were assigned weights higher than 0 are presented in Appendix 2. 
Compared to the countries, by which synthetic Georgia has been constructed the gap for the 
unit which was exposed to the intervention is considerably higher.  
Percentage shares of food exports to Russia to total export have been stable over the years and 
on average remained at 65%. Therefore, following the same approach paper analysed the effect 
of the agricultural embargo on total exports for Georgia to Russia which are depicted in figure 
6 below. In this case, largest weight is assigned to Armenia, equal to 0.788, followed by 
Azerbaijan with 0.179, Kyrgyz Republic (0.02) and Romania (0.014). Predictor balancing and 
weight tables are presented in Appendix 3. Analysis later is based on food exports from the 
treated unit.   
          Figure 6. Total exports to Russia from Georgia vs Synthetic Georgia 
 
 
           Source: author  
            Note: measured in thousands of US dollars 
 
5.1 Robustness check of the results 
 
A question which arises at this stage of the research is, if we had chosen another country, would 
we receive the same empirical results and conclusion. In order to answer this, I check the 
robustness of the estimated impact, by applying "placebo" exercises, similar to Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003). Application of placebo in space means applying the synthetic method to 
the countries previously used as potential controls. For obtaining placebo results, I run loop 
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which iteratively reassigns the intervention in space to all 19 countries, where the treatment 
unit is incremented and Georgia is switched to control pool. After this, I calculate the level of 
exports in case of the event for each synthetic country and estimate the effect with each placebo 
run. Eventual results in the form of placebo gaps are shown in figure 7. Grey lines show the 
difference between exports level of each country compared to its synthetic version. The gap 
for Georgia is presented with a darker line. If the gap for other countries is similar to Georgia 
then it could be concluded that the empirical results and analysis of the paper stating that 
sanctions had a negative effect are not significant.  
As it can be observed from figure 7 sanctions had a significant impact on food export from 
Georgia to Russia. However, gap for Croatia after the intervention is slightly bigger than for 
Georgia, which doesn’t came as a surprise, because this gap is higher even before the 
intervention, more precisely compared to other countries in the control pool, in our country list 
there won’t be a combination of countries which could produce synthetic Croatia, therefore 
this method wouldn’t be applicable for this country within these explanatory variables or 
potential control groups.  
 
       Figure 7. Gap of Food export to Russia from Georgia and placebo gaps for the rest of the controls 
 
         Source: author 
        Note: measured in thousands of US dollars 
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 If the same situation would be observed for Georgia, for example not matching before the 
treatment then we would say that fit wasn’t created correctly and the gap between export level 
of real versus synthetic Georgia wasn’t close to reality since the control group or the predictors 
weren’t created correctly. As it can be seen treated and synthetic Georgia match quite well 
before the ‘’shock’’. Estimated impact for Georgia is unusual – higher than in other “donor 
pool” countries – this is additional evidence that the sanctions had an impact on export from 
Georgia.  
5.2 Placebo in time  
Another type of Placebo test which is described in Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015) 
is in-time placebo, where intervention is assumed to occur during any pretreatment period and 
the results are compared to the outcome of the main empirical analysis. For this study, let’s 
assume that the event has happened in 2001, roughly in the middle of the pre-treatment period. 
In order to avoid effects of the actual event, the sample period is chosen until the year of 
intervention. I use the same predictors, which are averaged for the pretreatment period 1996-
2000. As shown in figure 8 divergence after the treatment is not that big as after the treatment 
in 2006. For the evidence, one should compare figure 8 to figure 4.  
 
            Figure 8. Synthetic Georgia Placebo treatment for 2001.  
 
 
              Source: author 
              Note: measured in thousands of US dollars 
 27 
 
Country weights and predictor balancing tables for a 2001 placebo treatment are presented in 
Appendix 4. Part of the divergence can be explained by the fact that for the treatment year of 
2001, 0 weights are assigned to Kazakhstan, Belarus and Serbia, opposite to the weights for 
the actual event of 2006.  
 
6. Effect on trade diversion 
 
To measure the effect on trade diversion paper takes food export to the EU as a dependent 
variable and runs the same analyses, on the treated unit Georgia. As can be seen from Table 4, 
weights assigned to the countries from the control pool differ compared to the case where 
export to Russia is treated as a dependent variable. In this case, synthetic Georgia is constructed 
by Armenia (0.639), Azerbaijan (0.023), Bulgaria (0.017), Kazakhstan (0.027), Kyrgyz 
Republic (0.262), Latvia (0.026) and Ukraine (0.007) 
 
Table 4. Weights assigned to the pool of controls 
 
Country Weight 
Armenia 0.639 
Azerbaijan 0.023 
Belarus   
Bulgaria 0.017 
Croatia 0 
Cyprus 0 
Estonia 0 
Kazakhstan 0.027 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.262 
Latvia 0.026 
Lithuania 0 
Moldova 0 
Romania 0 
FR(Serbia/Montenegro) 0 
Slovak republic 0 
Slovenia 0 
Turkey 0 
Ukraine 0.007 
 
                                          Source: author 
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Table 5. Predictor balancing 
 
  Georgia   
Variables  Real Synthetic 
GDP 3.82 3.81 
FDI 2.53 2.52 
Export to Russia 44291.98 34357.37 
GDP growth 6.62 7.44 
Unemployment rate 13.00 11.4 
Population 4398520 4377450 
Export to the EU (2005)  12391.07 12318.18  
Export to the EU (2001) 3060.09 3593.31 
Export to the EU (1997) 2650.86  4189.75 
                       Source: author 
 
           Figure 9. Export to the EU from Georgia vs Synthetic Georgia 
 
 
              Source: author 
              Note: measured in thousands of US dollars 
 
As depicted in figure 9 after the event, gap between exports of real and synthetic Georgia was 
positive until 2009, meaning that the trade with the EU would be lower in case of absence of 
sanctions. However, gap becomes negative beginning from 2012. This didn’t come as a 
surprise, since the process of diversion takes time, especially from the transitioning economy 
after socio-political crisis happening in Georgia.  
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Figure 10 presents trend of exports to the EU from Georgia over the period 1996-2012. In 2006 
trend depicts an increase, which drops in 2008, the reason for which might be Georgian-
Russian 5 days war. After the country started the process of recovery export to the western 
world has restored and reached its peak in 2014, when DCFTA was signed with the European 
Union.  
Figure 10. Exports from Georgia to the European Union 
 
 
    Data source: World integrated trade solution database www.wits.worldbank.org 
 
Furthermore, as shown in figure 11, until the intervention, highest share of food export from 
Georgia was accounted for Russia 53%, for European Union it was only 6%, however, right 
after the imposition of Russian sanctions on Georgian trade flow in 2006, these shares changed 
drastically. As shown in figure 12, in 2007 share of food export to Russia dropped to 0%, while 
export to the European Union had increased to 21%. Food export shares from Georgia for the 
year of 2017 are presented in figure 5.1 (Appendix 5). 
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Figure11. Food export from Georgia by partners in 2005 
 
 
Data source: World integrated trade solution database www.wits.worldbank.org 
 
 
Figure12. Food export from Georgia by partners in 2007 
 
 
Data source: World integrated trade solution database www.wits.worldbank.org 
 
Overall, to check how sensitive are the analysis presented in this paper one can compare food 
export to Russia from other geographic regions of the world (African countries, South 
America..) against the countries included into the control pool of this study, construct synthetic 
Georgia based on them and examine the effect of the event. As this paper includes mainly post-
Soviet countries and several Central and East European states, which at some extent resemble 
Georgia in terms of socio-political, historical or economic process and created a synthetic 
country which matched its real version quite well before the intervention.   
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7. Conclusion  
 
This paper examined the effect of Russian sanctions on Georgian trade flows and measured the 
effect on trade diversion. After demonstrating the ability of Synthetic Control Method (SCM) 
to be applied for studying the effects of sanctions, results depict the quantitative negative 
impact of Russian sanctions on Georgian food export. This method has been applied in several 
papers for examining country related trade effects (Billmeier and Nannicini 2013). Empirical 
analysis provides a comparison of real Georgia vs its counterfactual case of no treatment. For 
real country, food export to Russia was lower by 132,9 millions of US dollars, compared to the 
case of absence of the intervention. However, right after the event food exports to the European 
Union increased by 20,48 millions of US dollars compared to the case of absence of sanctions. 
After the intervention, in 2007 food export share to the European Union increased from 6% to 
21%, while the share of food exports to Russia was dropped from 53% to 0,004%. Results 
reveal that sanctions influenced structural processes of the trade flows of Georgia, as the 
country switched trade to new partners, which by empirical findings of the study lead to the 
evidence of trade diversion from Georgia to the European Union countries. Robustness check 
by placebo tests proved the significance of the results.  
One of the shortcomings of the synthetic control approach is considering the thought that 
countries have the same properties across time and an only country undergoing changes is the 
one, which was exposed to the intervention. In the real world, with an ongoing process of 
globalisation number of events can influence outcome variable of the study, thus unobserved 
heterogeneity can be present.    
Findings of the paper support the statement that political relations have affected trade flows of 
Georgia, however, country managed to divert its trade to the European Union countries. This 
diversion has not overcome the loss of trade with Russia, because right after the intervention 
in 2007, the difference between the export of synthetic Georgia to Russia and real Georgia to 
the European Union was approximately 112 millions of US dollars.  
Based on the flexibility of Synthetic Control Approach, this study can be extended further. One 
option could be considering an increased number of comparison groups and macroeconomic 
indicators as predictors which would create synthetic treated unit as close to its real version as 
possible. Also, one could conduct interviews with top exporters of Georgia to find out how 
Georgian producers overcame Russian sanctions. Furthermore, analyses could be extended by 
investigating whether Georgian products have been reaching Russian market by the use of 
“trade triangles” during the blockade.  
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Additionally, in 2013 Russia opened its borders to Georgian wine and mineral waters, however 
over the period of 2006-2013 other products would have replaced Georgians, thus investigating 
market share of Georgian products on Russian market before 2006 and after 2013 stands as an 
extended topic for further analysis of the effects of sanctions. Furthermore, as presented in 
figures 5.2 and 5.3 (Appendix 5) in 2018 export of wine and mineral water to Russia resembles 
the trend before the intervention, this topic should be researched further by considering changes 
in market shares of these exporting goods and their overall trade value.  
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Appendix 1. Technical outline of Synthetic Control method 
As presented by the authors of the model, let’s assume that we observe 𝐾 + 1 countries where 
only the first region is affected by the intervention. According to this, we have 𝐾 countries for 
potential controls. Let 𝑌itN   be an outcome variable which will be observed for the country i at 
time t for the case where no treatment takes place, for units 𝑖 = 1 … . , 𝐾 + 1 and time period 
𝑡 = 1, … 𝑇. Let’s denote number of preintervention periods with 𝑇0, with 1 ≤  𝑇0  <  𝑇.   
Let 𝑌itI be the outcome for unit i in time t in case of intervention during the periods 𝑇𝑜 + 1 to 
𝑇. We should assume that treatment has no effect on the outcome before the event time 𝑇0, 
meaning that 𝑌itN =  𝑌itI 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝜖{1, … , 𝑇0 }    
𝛼it = 𝑌itI − 𝑌itN is the effect of the intervention for i unit at time period t. Here we need to 
consider indicator 𝐷𝑖𝑡 ,     
Which will take value 1 if intervention happens to unit i and 0 otherwise. Outcome for unit i 
will be 𝑌it = 𝑌itN + 𝛼it𝐷it 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 = {
   1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 > 𝑇
 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
 
To estimate 𝛼1T0 +1, … , 𝛼iT for the period after the intervention (𝑡 > 𝑇0) we refer to the 
following equation: 𝛼it=𝑌itI − 𝑌itN = 𝑌it  −  𝑌itN  . Since 𝑌itI   is estimated to measure 𝛼it  we 
need to observe 𝑌itN. For this factor model needs to be considered 𝑌itN =  𝛿t + 𝜃t  𝑍i + 𝜆t𝜇t   
+ 𝜀it where notations have following meaning as explained by Abadie et.al (2010):  
𝛿t – unknown common factor  
𝑍i - (r × 1) vector of observed covariates not affected by the intervention  
𝜃t  - (r × 1) vector of unknown parameters 
𝜆t- (1 × F) vector of unobserved common factors 
𝜇t  - (F × 1) vector of unknown factor loadings   
𝜀it -  error terms, unobserved shocks  
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Now we should consider a (Jx1) vector of weights (𝑊 = 𝑤2 , … . 𝑤𝑗 + 1)
 ′      
In a way that 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0  for 𝑗 = 2, … . . , 𝐽 + 1 and 𝑤2 + ⋯ . +𝑤𝑗 + 1 = 1 and each value of 𝑊 is 
a potential synthetic control and the value of the dependent variable for each synthetic control 
is:  
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑍𝑗𝑡 + 𝑥𝜆𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝜇𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝜀𝑗𝑡
𝑗+2
𝑗=2
𝑗+1
𝑗=2
𝑗+1
𝑗=2
𝑗+1
𝑗=2
 
 
Based on Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) since we can choose 𝑤∗   so that:  
∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗𝑇0 = 𝑌1𝑇0    and 
𝑗+1
𝑗=2
    ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑍𝑗 = 𝑍1 
𝑗+1
𝑗=2
 
Then as an estimator for 𝛼1𝑡 this suggests using following formula during the periods 
𝑡𝜖{1, … , 𝑇0 } 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌1𝑡−  ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑗+1
𝑗=2
 
𝑤𝑗  denotes the 𝑗𝑡ℎelement of a given (𝐽 × 1) vector 𝑊, composed of optimal weights that 
solve the following problem.  
min‖𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊‖ = √(𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊)′𝑉(𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊) 
subject to 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0; ∑ 𝑤𝑗 = 1; 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽 + 1; 
𝑋1 is pre-intervention characteristics for the treatment unit and 𝑋0for untreated ones.  
𝑉 − (𝑘 × 𝑘) symmetric matrix with non-negative components determining the importance of 
explanatory variable. Since W depends on V, the latter should be chosen attentively, in order 
to assign larger weights to the pre-treatment variables, which have bigger predictive power on 
the outcome variable. One option for choosing V is based on minimizing MSPE (Mean square 
prediction error) of the dependent variable. (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003).   
However, iteration optimization procedure can be implemented which can search across all 
non-negative semidefinite V matrices and set weights for the best convex combination of the 
control units (Abadie et.al 2010). 
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Appendix 2. Placebo gap for countries having assigned weights >0 
 
Figures 1-4 show the gap between real and synthetic countries for which SCM has assigned 
weights higher than 0, thus Georgia has been constructed by the combination of them. As it 
can be compared to Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Serbia gap for Georgia is bigger. 
Similar trend is noticed for Kazakhstan, while the opposite situation is examined for Armenia 
Belarus and Serbia, where the gap after the intervention in 2006 is positive. 
Figure1. Gap for Armenia                           Figure 2. Gap for Belarus 
 
 
Figure3. Gap for Kazakhstan                 Figure 4. Gap for Serbia 
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Appendix 3 Results of the estimation of total exports.  
Table 3.1. Weights assigned to countries while estimating the effect on total exports from 
Georgia to Russia 
 
Country Weight 
Armenia 0.788 
Azerbaijan 0.179 
Belarus 0 
Bulgaria 0 
Croatia 0 
Cyprus 0 
Estonia 0 
Kazakhstan 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.02 
Latvia 0 
Lithuania 0 
Moldova 0 
Romania 0.014 
FR(Serbia/Montenegro) 0 
Slovak republic 0 
Slovenia 0 
Turkey 0 
Ukraine 0 
Source: author 
Table 3.2. Predictor balancing table for estimating effect on total export to Russia from Georgia 
  Georgia   
Variables  Real Synthetic 
GDP 3.82 3.81 
FDI 2.53 4.88 
Total export to EU 61031.48 444983.4  
GDP growth 6.62 8.83 
Unemployment rate 13.00 11.99 
Population 4398520 4268351 
total export to Russia(2005) 153725 148290.8 
total export to Russia(2001) 74005.2 61798.33 
total export to Russia(1997) 68691.1  76568.92 
Source: author 
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Appendix 4. Results for Placebo treatment in 2001.  
 
Table 4.1. Weights assigned to countries for Placebo treatment in 2001.  
 
Country Weight 
Armenia 0.624 
Azerbaijan 0.291 
Belarus 0  
Bulgaria 0 
Croatia 0 
Cyprus 0 
Estonia 0.085 
Kazakhstan 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 0 
Latvia 0 
Lithuania 0 
Moldova 0 
Romania 0 
FR(Serbia/Montenegro) 0  
Slovak republic 0 
Slovenia 0 
Turkey 0 
Ukraine 0 
Source: author 
 
Table 4.2. Predictor balancing table 
 
  Georgia   
Variables  Real Synthetic 
GDP 3.22 2.81 
FDI 1.80 2.92 
Export to EU 3190.57 5887.88 
GDP growth 5.90 5.80 
Unemployment rate 13.66 10.96 
Population 4501160 4363319 
Export to Russia(2000) 35014.47 23012.25  
Export to Russia(1998) 23168.53 24231.13 
Export to Russia(1997) 35127.66 31065.55  
Source: author 
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Appendix 5. Statistics of export shares  
 
Figure 5.1. Food export from Georgia by partners in 2017 
 
 
Data source: World integrated trade solution database www.wits.worldbank.org 
 
Figure 5.2. Dynamics of wine export from Georgia by top trading partners.  
 
 
Data source: UN Comtrade database www.comtrade.un.org 
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Figure 5.3. Dynamics in export of mineral waters from Georgia by top trading partners.  
 
 
Data source: UN Comtrade database www.comtrade.un.org 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Trend of food export to Russia vs the European Union.  
 
 
Data source: World integrated trade solution database www.wits.worldbank.org 
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